






















events	 is	 that	 of	 Crimea.	 The	 case	 of	 Crimea	 is	 highly	 interesting	 from	 a	 theoretical	






Over	 the	 years,	 self‐determination	 has	 been	 entering	 and	 leaving	 the	 international	
community's	consciousness,	but	never	quite	fading	from	it	completely.	The	right	of	self‐
determination,	and	all	 that	 it	entails	and	potentially	clashes	with,	 is	both	complex	and	









and	 interaction	 between	 them.	 Hence,	 this	 paper	 will	 begin	 with	 an	 examination	 of	
statehood,	the	most	fundamental	term	related	to	this	subject.	Given	the	tight	connection	
between	 statehood	 and	 recognition,	 recognition	 will	 be	 observed	 next.	 Following	 the	
question	of	recognition,	the	right	to	self‐determination,	perhaps	the	most	complex	of	the	
terms	 tackled	 in	 this	 paper,	 will	 then	 be	 examined.	 Later,	 the	 principle	 of	 territorial	
integrity,	often	seen	as	a	counter‐principle	to	that	of	self‐determination,	and	uti	possidetis	















No	 longer	 are	 states	 regarded	 as	 the	 only	 subjects	 of	 international	 law,	 but	
intergovernmental	organisations,	alongside	sui	generis	entities	(such	as	the	Holy	See	and	
the	Sovereign	Military	Order	of	Malta),	have	also	been	widely	recognised	as	subjects	of	
international	 law.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 certain	 subjects,	 such	 as	 non‐governmental	
organisations	and	individuals,	have	been	at	the	core	of	many	debates	as	to	whether	or	not	









Given	 the	 prevailing	 role	 of	 states	 in	 international	 law,	 it	 is	 of	 utmost	 importance	 to	
determine	 the	 exact	 criteria	 for	 gaining	 statehood.	 Unfortunately,	 international	 law	
provides	only	glimpses	of	the	requirements	for	statehood.	In	saying	this,	however,	there	
has	been	one	convention	 in	particular	 that	has	outlined	the	criteria	 for	statehood.	The	
convention	in	question	is	the	Montevideo	Convention	on	the	Rights	and	Duties	of	States,2	
which	 specified	 that:	 ''The	 State	 as	 a	 person	 of	 international	 law	 should	 possess	 the	
following	qualifications:	a)	a	permanent	population;	b)	a	defined	territory;	c)	government;	





However,	 the	said	provisions	are	neither	exhaustive	nor	 immutable.4	For	example,	 the	
way	a	new	State	 came	 to	be	 is	often	one	of	 the	deciding	 factors	 that	 the	 international	
community	takes	into	account	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	recognise	it.	Naturally,	a	




Although	 the	 conditions	 for	 statehood,	 listed	 in	 the	 Montevideo	 Convention,	 can	 be	
expanded	to	feature	several	other	conditions,	they	can	likewise	be	reduced	to	only	three	
or	even	two	necessary	conditions.	As	will	be	shown	later,	some	states	in	their	early	stages	




In	 terms	 of	 recognition,	 there	 are	 two	 different	 schools	 of	 thought	 regarding	 its	
importance	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 State	 and	 thus	 there	 are	 two	 related	 theories:	 the	




























debates,	 but	 rather	 as	 an	 indisputable	 legal	 right.	 Treaties,	 solemn	declarations	of	 the	
General	 Assembly	 of	 the	 United	Nations10	 and	 decisions	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	
Justice11	recognise	self‐determination	as	a	legal	right.12	That	being	said,	while	the	right	to	
self‐determination	 has	 indeed	 been	 explored,	 given	 its	 context	 and	 relevance	 to	
contemporary	 international	 law,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 it	 is	 free	 from	 many	 dangling	













and	Co‐operation	 among	 States	 in	Accordance	with	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	United	Nations	 (1970)	 that	 self‐
determination	was	provided	with	a	more	detailed	explanation.	
11	Several	cases	were	brought	before	the	International	Court	of	Justice,	such	as	the	Western	Sahara	Case	
(1975)	and	the	East	Timor	Case	(1995).	The	East	Timor	Case	 in	particular	 is	 interesting,	given	how	the	
International	Court	of	Justice	explicitly	stated	that	self‐determination	is	''one	of	the	essential	principles	of	
contemporary	international	law'',	which	enjoys	''an	erga	omnes	character''.	See:	Summary	of	the	Judgment	








relatively	 simple,	 the	 answer	 is	 unfortunately	 anything	 but.	 While	 the	 right	 to	 self‐





''All	 people	 have	 the	 right	 to	 self‐determination;	 by	 virtue	 of	 that	 right	 they	 freely	
determine	 their	 political	 status	 and	 freely	 pursue	 their	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	
development.''15	The	elements	of	this	distilled	definition	are	at	the	core	of	almost	every	




become	at	 least	a	bit	clearer	during	 its	development.	 In	order	to	 truly	understand	this	
right,	one	must	observe	it	from	the	very	beginning,	since	it	is	neigh	on	impossible	to	fully	
comprehend	it	from	just	a	single	source	of	international	law.	
The	 full	 implications	of	 the	notion	of	 self‐determination,	 introduced	 into	 international	
politics	by	Woodrow	Wilson16	after	World	War	I	and	affirmed	by	the	Charter	of	the	United	
Nations,	were	unknown,	but	feared,	by	the	international	community	in	1945.17	Because	it	
was	more	of	 a	political	 aspiration18	 first	 and	 foremost,	 especially	during	World	War	 I,	






Assembly	 resolution	1514	 (XV),	 entitled	 the	Declaration	on	Granting	 Independence	 to	
																																																								
14	For	instance,	the	definition	of	self‐determination	can	be	found	in	the	International	Covenant	of	Civil	and	





principle	 that	 governments	 must	 be	 based	 on	 the	 'consent	 of	 the	 governed'''.	 Velasco,	 Z.	 A.,	 ''Self‐















greatly	 expanded.	 This	 is	 no	 more	 apparent	 than	 in	 the	 two	 conventions	 on	 human	
rights,21	both	dating	from	1966.	Article	1	of	both	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	
Political	Rights	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	





is	not	 the	only	major	stage	of	 its	development.	The	second	major	change	 for	 this	right	
came	 in	 the	 light	 of	 making	 a	 distinction	 between	 internal	 and	 external	 self‐
determination.	 However,	 the	 division	 of	 self‐determination	 into	 internal	 and	 external	
aspects	 is	 not	 spelled	 out	 with	 any	 precision	 in	 international	 instruments,	 leaving	
considerable	ambiguity	as	to	what	these	two	aspects	might	relate	to.22	
Since	self‐determination	was	no	 longer	reserved	for	people	that	 lived	 in	colonies,	 fear,	
figuratively	 speaking,	 started	 to	 creep	 into	many	 states.	 Since	 states	 feared	 that	 their	
territorial	integrity	was	at	stake,	legal	theorists	across	the	world	began	to	figure	out	a	way	
to	essentially	minimise	the	risk	of	a	possible	follow‐up	event	‐	secession.	So,	in	an	effort	
























the	 whole	 people	 of	 the	 territory	 and	 which	 confers	 equal	 rights	 on	 all	 persons	 and	
respects	and	protects	their	human	rights.24	Essentially,	internal	self‐determination	is	the	
preferred	way	 of	 dealing	with	 self‐determination,	while	 external	 self‐determination	 is	
seen	 as	 the	 last	 resort.	 The	 frequently	 cited	 criteria	 of	 the	 right	 to	 external	 self‐
determination25	are:	grave	and	repeated	violations	of	human	rights	and	the	continuous	
negation	of	the	right	to	internal	self‐determination.26		
The	 whole	 point	 of	 dividing	 the	 right	 to	 self‐determination	 into	 two	 separate	
subcategories	 was	 and	 still	 is	 completely	 redundant.	 It	 just	 shows	 how	muddled	 the	
thought	process	behind	this	right	truly	is.	Over	time,	self‐determination	almost	became	a	
synonym	for	secession.	While	the	two	terms	do	indeed	have	a	point	of	intersection,	the	
two	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 one.	 Self‐determination	 pertains	 to	 human	 rights,	 while	
secession	forms	part	of	a	wider	debate	on	statehood	and	state	recognition,27	which	is	why	
dividing	self‐determination	 into	 two	groups	makes	no	sense.	The	division	 itself	means	
that	 essentially	 a	 group	 of	 people	 are	 ''locked	 out''	 of	 the	 said	 right	 in	 certain	
circumstances,	which	makes	no	sense,	seeing	how	self‐determination	 is	a	basic	human	
right	meant	for	all	people.	Furthermore,	the	division	itself	actually	appears	to	approve	the	
tight	 linkage	 between	 the	 right	 to	 self‐determination	 and	 the	 follow‐up	 process	 of	
secession.		
With	the	division	came	the	question:	''who	are	these	people	that	enjoy	the	right	to	external	
self‐determination?''	 Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 no	 general	 consensus	 on	 an	 answer,	 just	













called	 the	 right	 to	 ''remedial	 self‐determination''	 and	 the	 instrument	 that	 enforces	 it	 is	 often	 called	
''remedial	secession''.	Velasco,	op.	cit.	(n.	16)	p.	82	










Territorial	 integrity	 as	 a	 principle	 can	 be	 found	 in	 many	 declarations,	 resolutions,	





or	 total	 disruption	 of	 the	 national	 unity	 and	 territorial	 integrity	 of	 any	 other	 State	 or	
country''.	 Whenever	 the	 principle	 of	 territorial	 integrity	 is	 mentioned,	 it	 is	 always	
regarded	as	one	of	the	founding	principles	of	utmost	importance	for	a	State.	Basically,	the	
principle	 of	 respect	 for	 territorial	 integrity	 is	 a	 corollary	 of	 state	 sovereignty,	 as	 it	
provides	 the	 territorial	 framework,	 that	 is,	 the	 spatial	 context	 for	 the	 existence	of	 the	
State.34	
Territorial	integrity	is	closely	connected	with	the	doctrine	of	uti	possidetis,	according	to	
which	 colonial	 boundaries	 and	 possibly	 the	 boundaries	 of	 federal	 units	 are	 to	 be	
respected	and	protected	by	international	law,	however	arbitrary	and	unjust	their	origin.35	
Uti	possidetis	played	an	important	role	in	the	decolonisation	era,	as	it	was	considered	the	




30	The	doctrine	of	uti	possidetis	 is	 rooted	 in	an	edict	of	Roman	property	 law	which	allowed	a	person	 in	



















That	being	said,	one	should	also	question	 the	use	of	 the	principle	of	uti	possidetis	within	 the	context	of	














politics	taking	over	the	role	of	 law,	apart	 from	the	obvious	uncertainty	 it	brings,	 is	the	







violations	 has	 been	 perpetrated	 by	 the	 government	 against	 a	 collective	 of	 individuals	
located	on	an	identifiable	part	of	the	territory	of	the	State,	the	right	for	this	collective	of	
individuals	 to	 secede	 from	 that	 territory	 is	 triggered.38	 Secession	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 last	
resort,39	when	every	other	option	fails	and	people's	lives	would	be	seriously	endangered	
if	 they	were	 to	 remain	 in	 such	 a	 State.	 Therefore,	 some	 see	 secession	 as	 some	 sort	 of	
remedy,	and	hence	the	coined	term	''remedial	secession''.	





them.	What	secession	actually	does	 is	 that	 it	 shifts	 the	balance	of	power	 in	 the	newly‐








































fifth	 condition,	 however,	 poses	 its	 fair	 share	 of	 problems.	 What	 exactly	 are	 these	
''reasonable	 opportunities''	 the	 said	 people	must	 exhaust	 before	 securing	 the	 right	 to	
secede?	This	usually	means	that	representatives	of	both	the	State	and	the	people	must	sit	
down	 and	 negotiate.	 However,	 this	 begs	 the	 following	 question:	 how	 soon	 after	






42	 This	 effectively	means	 that	minorities	 that	 are	 widespread	 across	 a	 State,	 without	 having	 a	 notable	
concentration	on	a	particular	piece	of	 territory,	would	not	be	eligible	 for	secession,	even	 if	all	 the	other	
criteria	were	met.	
43	These	first	two	criteria	link	secession	with	self‐determination.	











State,	would	 be	 illegal	 and	would	 be	met	with	 the	 sanction	 of	 non‐recognition.47	 This	
prohibition	 comes	 from	 a	 peremptory	 norm	 contained	 in	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	 United	


















The	 cases	 of	 Kosovo,	 Abkhazia	 and	 South	 Ossetia	 are	 interesting	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
potential	formation	of	legal	criteria	regarding	secession.	These	three	cases	are	not	unlike	
each	other,	yet	the	outcome	of	Kosovo,	on	one	hand,	and	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia,	on	
the	other,	differs	greatly.	Not	only	 that,	but	 the	 international	 community's	perspective	
also	changed	radically	over	the	years.	While	the	international	community	disregarded	the	











8	 per	 cent	 Serbs.52	 Kosovo	 enjoyed	 some	 form	 of	 autonomy	 in	 the	 Socialist	 Federal	
Republic	 of	 Yugoslavia,	 although	 in	 1989	 Serbia	 unilaterally	 and	 unconstitutionally	
removed	Kosovo's	 autonomy,53	 prompting	Kosovo	 to	declare	 independence	 in	1991.54	













1244	 (1999)	 in	which	 it	 replaced	Serbian	sovereignty	 in	Kosovo	with	an	 international	
civilian	 administration	 and	 a	 NATO‐led59	 military	 force.60	 This	 in	 turn	 led	 to	 more	



























to	 embrace	 Kosovo	 as	 an	 independent	 State.	 Within	 less	 than	 two	 weeks	 from	 the	
declaration	 of	 independence,	 21	 states	 had	 already	 recognised	 Kosovo	 as	 a	 sovereign	
State,	including	12	European	Union	Member	States	and,	most	notably,	the	United	States	
of	 America,62	 while	 the	 most	 prominent	 states	 that	 opposed	 recognition,	 apart	 from	
Serbia,	 were	 Russia	 and	 China.	 A	 legitimate	 question	 arose:	 ''how	 could	 Kosovo	 be	










lack	 of	 it,	 of	 Kosovo	 by	 states.	 Most	 recognising	 states	 stressed	 different	 political	
considerations64	in	support	of	their	act,	without	going	into	detail	about	the	law	concerning	

























Obviously,	 Serbia	 was	 not	 thrilled	 by	 the	 declaration	 of	 independence,	 even	 though	
everything	pointed	to	its	inevitability.	Almost	as	an	act	of	desperation,	Serbia	turned	to	
the	International	Court	of	Justice.	The	United	Nations’	General	Assembly,	at	the	behest	of	
Serbia,	 requested	 from	 the	 International	Court	 of	 Justice	 an	advisory	opinion69	 on	 the	
legality	of	this	declaration	under	international	law.70	The	posed	question	was	extremely	
narrow	in	scope	and,	unfortunately,	so	was	the	Court's	advisory	opinion.	The	Court	simply	





When	 Kosovo's	 secession	 is	 observed	 through	 those	 five	 aforementioned	 conditions,	
there	is	no	doubt	that	the	said	secession	is	valid.	Kosovo	Albanians	certainly	fit	the	bill	of	
people	with	 a	 separate	 identity,	when	 compared	 to	 Serbs.	Their	 ethnicity,	 culture	 and	
language	are	 all	 fundamentally	different	 from	 those	of	 Serbs.	However,	 if	 one	were	 to	
expand	on	this	condition	and	consider	the	identity	of	Kosovo	Albanians	in	relation	to	that	
of	native	Albanians,	things	become	more	complicated	and	not	as	easily	discernible.	This	





































whether	 Kosovo	 constituted	 a	 State,	 at	 least	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 proclaimed	






In	 conclusion,	 there	 are	 still	 lingering	 questions	 about	 Kosovo's	 secession	 and	


























these	 declarations	 resulted	 in	 recognition	 by	 other	 states.78	 Several	 years	 later	 and	
following	certain	events	Russia	formally	recognised	both	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	as	
independent	states.	Soon	after	Russia’s	recognition,	a	few	other	states	followed	suit.	
Russia	 proclaimed	 itself	 a	 mediator	 in	 these	 ethnic	 conflicts	 and	 sent	 some	 of	 its	
peacekeeping	 troops79	 to	 the	 conflict‐torn	 territories	 of	 Georgia.	 However,	 underlying	
tensions	escalated	in	the	summer	of	2008,	when	Georgian	troops	launched	an	offensive	
against	 the	 South	 Ossetian	 capital,	 Tskhinvali,	 which	 in	 turn	 made	 Russia	 react	
immediately	with	a	fierce	counter‐offensive,	officially	in	response	to	the	killing	of	Russian	
peacekeeping	forces	by	Georgian	troops.80	Soon	afterwards,	Abkhazia	joined	the	conflict.	





It	 did	not	 take	 long	 for	Russia	 to	 capitalise	on	 the	precedent	 set	by	 the	 secession	and	
recognition	of	Kosovo.	On	26	August	2008,	a	few	weeks	after	the	cessation	of	hostilities,	
Russia	 formally	 recognised	 South	 Ossetia	 and	 Abkhazia	 as	 independent	 states.82	 This	
move	 by	 Russia	 mirrors	 perfectly	 the	 recognition	 of	 Kosovo	 by	 western	 states	 and,	



















83	 Among	 others,	 Russia	 cited	 the	 Declaration	 on	 Principles	 of	 International	 Law	 Concerning	 Friendly	




















the	 early	 1990s,	 which	 later	 led	 to	 civil	 war,	 is	 a	 clear	 breach	 of	 the	 right	 to	 self‐
determination.	 The	 question	 of	 widespread	 and	 gross	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 is	
muddled	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 conflicts	 were	 poorly	 catalogued	 by	 the	 international	
community.	In	his	speech,	Medvedev,	who	was	at	the	time	the	acting	president	of	Russia,	








































Its	 specific	 location	 has	 made	 it	 an	 important	 strategic	 position	 for	 centuries,	 while	





the	control	of	 the	 then	Kiev	Empire,	 thus	 in	 the	beginning	 it	was	mostly	populated	by	
Ukrainians.	That	was	up	until	the	13th	century,	when	Tatars	made	an	assault	on	the	Kiev	
Empire	 and	 the	 ''Golden	 Horde''	 took	 over	 Crimea.91	 After	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Mongolian	
Empire,	the	majority	of	Tatars	left	Crimea,	so	Ukrainians	again	made	up	the	vast	majority	






















within	 the	boundaries	of	Ukraine.	However,	 this	 form	of	 autonomy	did	not	 satisfy	 the	
Russians’	strong	desire	for	independence.	For	this	reason,	encouraged	by	the	support	and	





Following	 the	 decision	 of	 Ukraine's	 government	 in	 late	 November	 2013	 to	 call	 off	
preparations	 for	 the	Association	Agreement	with	 the	 European	Union,	massive	 public	










now	 furious	 with	 their	 government,	 demanded	 the	 government's	 resignation,	 the	



























would	 lead	 to	 an	 even	 greater	 ethnic	 imbalance	 in	 the	 region.	 Following	 Russia's	
intervention,	 the	 supposedly	 self‐proclaimed	 and	 illegitimate	 authorities	 of	 Crimea	
decided	on	6	March	2014	to	ask	Russia	to	incorporate	Crimea	into	the	Russian	Federation	
and	 called	a	 referendum	 for	16	March	2014	on	Crimean	 secession	 from	Ukraine,	 thus	
violating	the	constitutions	of	both	Ukraine	and	Crimea.103		




Crimea	 shares	 some	 of	 the	 similarities	with	 the	 cases	 of	 Kosovo,	 Abkhazia	 and	 South	



















European	 Union	 agreed	 to	 a	 package	 of	 significant	 additional	 restrictive	 measures	 targeting	 sectoral	






these	 groups,	 apart	 from	not	 sharing	 the	 same	 ethnicity,	 have	 their	 own	 cultures	 and	
languages,	which	is	to	say	that	each	of	these	groups	has	its	own	identity.	
With	all	the	recent	developments,	 it	 is	hard	to	pin	an	exact	number	and	percentage	on	
each	 of	 these	 groups.	 However,	 in	 the	 2001	 Ukrainian	 Census,106	 around	 60%	 of	 the	
people	declared	themselves	Russians,	while	around	25%	and	10%	declared	themselves	




native	 language	by	10%	of	 the	population	respectively.107	This	 is	especially	 important,	
because	 Russia	 expressed	 its	 desire	 to	 speed	 up	 the	 process	 of	 granting	 Russian	
citizenship	for	the	Russian‐speaking	population.	This	effectively	means	that	the	balance	
might	swing	even	more	to	the	Russian	ethnic	side.	
The	 distinctness	 of	 the	 territory	 these	 people	 inhabit	 could	 not	 be	 any	 clearer.	 The	











is	 what	 is	 commonly	 known	 as	 ''internal	 self‐determination''.	 While	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
Autonomous	 Republic	 of	 Crimea	 with	 its	 own	 administration,	 albeit	 only	 within	 the	
boundaries	of	Ukraine,	was	not	exactly	what	Russians	had	in	mind	when	they	demanded	
autonomy,	it	is	hard	to	argue	that	Crimea's	population	and,	among	it,	the	Russians,	were	
















its	 citizens	 in	 Crimea	 and	 not	 to	 extinguish	 possible	 breaches	 of	 human	 rights.	While	
Russia's	presence	might,	in	theory,	have	prevented	an	escalation	of	events	and	possible	
human	 rights	 violations,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 there	 were	 no	 reports	 of	 gross	 and	
widespread	violations	up	until	that	point.	
The	separatists	were,	however,	so	adamant	in	their	desire	for	Crimea	to	secede	that	they	
never	 even	 wanted	 negotiations	 with	 the	 new	 Ukrainian	 government,	 and	 no	 real	
negotiations	ever	took	place.	They	sought	to	capitalise	fully	on	Ukraine's	crisis	and	went	
on	 to	 call	 a	 referendum	 on	 secession.	 The	 referendum	 was	 successful,109	 but	 was	
disregarded	 as	 unlawful	 by	 Ukraine	 and	 almost	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 international	
community.	 Obviously,	 separatists	 had	 not	 exhausted	 all	 reasonable	 opportunities	 for	
negotiations,	 since	 the	 object	 of	 their	 long‐lasting	 desire	was	 something	 that	was	 not	
negotiable.	
One	must	also	ponder	on	 the	validity	of	Russia's	 intervention	and	 its	 influence	on	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 secession.	 Putting	 aside	 the	 questionable	 pre‐emptive	 nature	 of	 the	
intervention,	as	one	could	possibly	attempt	to	justify	it	as	an	early	protective	measure,	
that	was	carried	out	to	ensure	the	safety	of	Russians	in	Crimea,	but	the	sheer	scope	and	






















in	 particular	 military	 actions,	 which	 might	 entail	 breaches	 of	 the	 Convention	 rights	 of	 the	 civilian	
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points	 in	Crimea,	but	Russia	deployed	even	more	 troops	 to	 the	 area	and	 continued	 to	
support	the	pro‐Russian	gunmen.	




One	 could	 draw	 a	 parallel	 between	 the	 United	 Nations'	 intervention	 in	 Kosovo	 and	
Russia's	 intervention	 in	Crimea,	 as	 both	 shared	 a	 similar	 outcome	–	 after	 a	 quick,	 but	
forceful	 intervention,	 the	 military	 troops	 of	 the	 predecessor	 states	 had	 to	 withdraw.	




since	 there	 are	 essentially	 no	 legal	 rules	 governing	 the	 topic,	 merely	 theoretical	






































decided	 to	 accede	 to	 the	Russian	Federation,	 and	with	 a	decree113	 it	 scheduled	 for	16	
March	 2014	 a	 local	 Crimean	 referendum,	 including	 the	 city	 of	 Sevastopol,	 with	 the	











integrity	 differs	 from	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 same	 name	 found	 in	 international	 law.	 One	
focuses	on	 the	 inner‐state,	while	 the	other	on	 inter‐state	relations.	Both	principles	are	












116	 Letter	 dated	 15	March	 2014	 from	 the	 Permanent	 Representative	 of	 Ukraine	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	
addressed	to	the	President	of	the	Security	Council	(S/2014/193)	p.	1.	


























The	 topics	 of	 self‐determination	 and	 secession	 are	 riddled	 with	 vagueness,	
inconsistencies	 and	 hypocrisy,	 which	 are	 best	 seen	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 Kosovo	 and	 South	
Ossetia.	There	does	not	seem	to	be	a	will	within	the	international	community	to	finally	
regulate	the	said	topics,	since	there	have	been	many	examples,	whether	successful	or	not,	









aspect	of	secession	 is	so	underdeveloped	that,	 if	 there	 is	a	will,	Crimea	could	easily	be	
																																																								
119	According	to	the	results,	announced	by	the	de	facto	authorities	in	Donetsk	and	Luhansk,	about	90%	of	a	









The	crux	of	 the	problem	is	 that	secession	still	resides	mostly	 in	 the	political,	not	 legal,	













pozornost	međunarodne	 zajednice	 usmjerili	 na	 kontroverzna	 pitanja	 samoodređenja	 i	
odcjepljenja.	 Na	 žalost,	 mnoga	 pitanja	 koja	 prožimaju	 ove	 dvije	 teme	 i	 koja	 ih	 čine	
kontroverznima,	 među	 koja	 pripada	 i	 manjkava	 pravna	 regulacija,	 do	 danas	 su	
nerazjašnjena.	Ovaj	članak	razmatra	teorijske	temelje	ovih	dviju	tema	te	se	nakon	toga	
usredotočuje	na	nedavne	slučajeve	koji	su	upozorili	na	sve	nedostatke,	nedosljednosti	i	
nelogičnosti	u	ovim	i	s	njima	povezanim	temama.		
Ključne	riječi:	samoodređenje,	odcjepljenje,	Kosovo,	Abhazija,	Južna	Osetija,	Krim	
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